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Abstract
In trust negotiation and other distributed proving systems, networked entities cooperate to
form proofs that are justified by collections of certified attributes. These attributes may be ob-
tained through interactions with any number of external entities and are collected and validated
over an extended period of time. Though these collections of credentials in some ways resemble
partial system snapshots, these systems currently lack the notion of a consistent global state in
which the satisfaction of authorization policies should be checked. In this paper, we argue that
unlike the notions of consistency studied in other areas of distributed computing, the level of
consistency required during policy evaluation is predicated solely upon the security requirements
of the policy evaluator. As such, there is little incentive for entities to participate in compli-
cated consistency preservation schemes like those used in distributed computing, distributed
databases, and distributed shared memory. We go on to show that the most intuitive notion
of consistency fails to provide basic safety guarantees under certain circumstances and then
propose several more refined notions of consistency which provide stronger safety guarantees.
We provide algorithms that allow each of these refined notions of consistency to be attained in
practice with minimal overheads.
1 Introduction
It is difficult to design flexible and secure authorization systems for environments in which trust
relationships cannot be determined a priori. Two proposed authorization techniques for these
types of environments are trust negotiation [4, 5, 12, 14, 15, 21, 23, 25] and distributed proving [3,
18, 24]. In these types of systems, participants collect certified credentials that describe their
attributes, environmental conditions, and other state information from any number of external
entities. These credentials can then be used when attempting to satisfy the authorization policies
protecting sensitive resources in the system.
To some extent, the collection of credentials used to satisfy a given authorization policy acts
as a partial snapshot of the system within which the policy is evaluated. This is an abuse of
terminology, however, as this snapshot is collected over a variable-length window of time and thus
may not actually represent a system state that ever existed; to avoid confusion, in this paper we
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will refer to these collections of credentials as views. Clearly, the correctness of an authorization
decision depends on the validity and stability of the view used during policy evaluation. If we
assume that each credential is stable (i.e., that the assertion stated in the credential remains
true until its pre-ordained expiration time) then policy evaluation can be reduced to the problem
of stable predicate evaluation on distributed snapshots [8]. However, because it is possible for
credentials to become invalidated prematurely, this somewhat naive model of policy evaluation can
erode the safety guarantees of the underlying authorization system. This is especially worrisome in
trust negotiation and distributed proving, as interactions in these types of systems typically involve
multiple rounds of interaction and credential exchange. Consider the following two examples of the
problems that can be caused by unstable credentials.
Example 1. Bob works in the Finance department of Acme Petroleum Corporation (APeC),
though he also spends part of his time “on loan” to the Petroleum Operations group helping manage
their operational budget. While consulting for the operations group, Bob is given a PetrolOps
group credential to allow him basic access to the operations group’s resources. To speed up some
of his research, Bob wishes to access an online geological database provided by GeoTech, a third-
party vendor. GeoTech allows operations group members at Department of Energy certified Oil
Companies trial access to the database, provided that their company authorizes them to make
purchases of over $10,000 (the cost of a department subscription to the database). Bob submits
his PetrolOps group credential and APeC’s OilCorp credential to GeoTech along with a policy
stating that it must provide proof of membership in the Better Business Bureau to see his purchase
authorization. GeoTech verifies Bob’s PetrolOps credential and APeC’s OilCorp credential and then
sends Bob its BBB credential. As a consultant to the operations group, Bob is not authorized
to make purchases of more than $200, so he should not be able to satisfy this policy. However,
Bob can make purchases of this size for the Finance group. Bob then activates his Finance group
credential (which invalidates his PetrolOps credential) and obtains a certified Purchase attestation
authorizing him to make purchases of up to $10,000 dollars, which he then submits to GeoTech.
GeoTech verifies this credential and grants Bob access to the database. The inconsistent system
view used by the database leads to the permission of an undesirable access.
Example 2. Alice is a PhD student studying infectious diseases at State University. As part of
her research, Alice wishes to access an outbreak incident database hosted by the Center for Disease
Control. The CDC requires that academic users of this data be US citizens and members of an
NSF-sponsored epidemiology project. To this end, Alice discloses her Student credential issued by
State University and her ProjectSpread credential issued by the NSF. Alice considers her citizenship
private, however, and requires that she first receive a certified privacy policy that she manually
reviews prior to releasing her citizenship credential. Alice submits a policy to this effect to the
CDC. The CDC verifies Alice’s Student and ProjectSpread credentials and then discloses its certi-
fied PrivacyPolicy to Alice. Just then, Alice’s research adviser calls and notifies her that effective
immediately, she will no longer be supported by the Spread project; the NSF then revokes her
ProjectSpread credential. Alice then reviews the PrivacyPolicy submitted by the CDC and decides
that it is safe to disclose her USCitizen credential. The CDC verifies this credential and permits
Alice to access the requested data, as it did not detect that her project membership had been
revoked prior to policy satisfaction.
The safety problems that emerged in the above examples occur because credentials are collected
over a non-instantaneous window of time. In general, credential and policy instabilities can arise
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from one or more of the following four causes. First, the natural expiration of a credential can cause
problems if a previously-valid credential expires before other required credentials can be validated.
Second, inter-credential dependencies can give rise to problems if, for example, the activation of a
new role causes the revocation of a previously activated role (as in Example 1). Third, an external
event might cause the invalidation of a certain credential after it is validated, but prior to the entire
policy being satisfied. For example, the removal of Alice from the Spread project in Example 2
caused credential revocation. Lastly, an unstable environment could cause policy instability if the
policy is predicated on some aspect of the environment, such as the time of day or occupancy status
of a room.
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of enforcing view consistency in trust negotiation
and distributed proving systems has not been discussed elsewhere in the literature. Though similar
to the consistency problems studied in distributed systems [20], distributed databases [7], and
distributed shared memory [1], it is in many ways their dual. In these previous works, ensuring
a consistent global state has been the concern of both data providers and users, as many entities
can update the values of data fields replicated at a number of sites; this provides all parties with
the incentive to cooperate. However, since a credential revocation can be made only by the issuer
of that credential (and thus consistent update sequences can be attained trivially), the problem
studied in this paper becomes the concern only of data consumers. In fact, the degree to which
each data consumer is concerned with this problem may even vary based on the criticality of the
policy being evaluated. For instance, a hardware store offering a discount to students of a particular
university will probably not be concerned if a student ID credential is revoked after it has been
issued for the semester, much less if it is revoked during a policy evaluation; an electronic door lock
protecting access to expensive laboratory equipment at the university would care, however. Heavy-
weight solutions that require the cooperation of groups of certificate authorities (CAs) and users
are not suitable, as the consistency property required will vary from user to user and preserving
the autonomy of entities in the open system is of the utmost importance.
In this paper, we make several contributions regarding the level of safety attainable when eval-
uating policies in authorization systems that employ trust negotiation or other forms of distributed
proving. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first formalization of the view consistency
problem for trust negotiation and distributed proving systems and show how naive approaches to
policy evaluation can lead to the permission of undesirable accesses to system resources in the
face of prematurely invalidated credentials (Section 2). We then define several levels of credential
view consistency, each of which provides different guarantees on the types of inappropriate access
conditions that can be prevented (Section 3). We provide algorithms that can be incorporated into
existing trust negotiation and distributed proving systems to attain these levels of consistency and
prove the correctness of each algorithm (Section 4). We also demonstrate other desirable charac-
teristics of these algorithms, including the fact that they require only minimal cooperation between
the users engaged in the the trust negotiation or distributed proving protocol and no cooperation
between groups of CAs or other users (Section 5). Finally, we comment on previous related work
(Section 6) and examine potential areas for future work (Section 7).
2 System Assumptions and Problem Definition
In this section, we present our assumptions regarding the open systems in which trust negotiation
and distributed proving protocols are used. We then formally describe the problem of determining
the consistency level of a system view used to evaluate an authorization policy.
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2.1 System Model
An open system consists of a possibly infinite set E of entities, each of which is a resource provider,
client, or both. Resource providers are entities who wish to offer resources or services to other
entities in the system, while clients are entities that access the functionality offered by resource
providers. Resource providers may wish to enforce authorization checks on the resources or services
that they provide, though due to the lack of pre-existing trust relationships in the system, traditional
identity-based solutions to this problem cannot be used. As such, trust negotiation or distributed
proving approaches to authorization will be used.
We place no limitations on the temporal duration of a trust negotiation or distributed proving
session other than those imposed by the underlying protocol. For example, many trust negotiation
protocols halt if no measurable progress is made during a particular round of the negotiation [14, 25];
we do not prevent this, nor do we require any such constraints be in place. Unless explicitly stated
to the contrary, we assume that the credentials used by an entity during the execution of one of these
protocols may be obtained dynamically at runtime. This assumption allows portions of a distributed
proof to be “outsourced” to other entities (as in [3, 18, 24]) and permits entities to acquire new
attribute certificates while a trust negotiation session is in progress. These assumptions indicate
that the collection of credentials used as the view in which an authorization policy is satisfied
may be composed of the observations of an arbitrary number of entities and be collected over a
variable-width window of time.
We assume that the certified attribute and environmental state information used to satisfy trust
negotiation policies or form distributed proofs will be issued by an arbitrary number of CAs that
exist in the system. All credentials issued will have an expiration time but may also be revoked
prematurely by the issuing CA (as was the case with Alice’s ProjectSpread credential in Section 1).
In the remainder of this paper, we will denote the set of all credentials by C. Given a credential
c ∈ C, we denote by α(c) the earliest time at which the issuing CA would possibly consider c to be
valid. In the case of X.509 certificates [10], α(c) would be the time indicated in the “Not Before”
field of the certificate; if no such field exists, then α(c) indicates the issue time of the credential.
Similarly, we denote the expiration time of a credential c by ω(c). We assume that once a credential
is revoked, it will never again become valid. Since only the issuing CA may revoke a credential,
each CA can ensure that an omniscient view of the credentials that it has issued remains consistent
at all times. We assume that each CA offers an online method that allows any entity to check
the current status of a particular credential issued by the CA. This functionality could be provided
through the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [19] or by an online CA such as COCA [26].
2.2 Problem Definition
Prior to accepting a given credential as evidence that can be used to satisfy some portion of an
authorization policy, the policy evaluator must first verify that the credential is valid. In this paper,
we are concerned with two types of credential validity: syntactic and semantic.
Definition 1 (Syntactic Validity). A credential c is syntactically valid if the following conditions
hold: (i) it is formatted properly, (ii) it has a valid digital signature, (iii) the time α(c) has passed,
and (iv) the time ω(c) has not yet passed.
Definition 2 (Semantic Validity). A credential c issued at time ti is semantically valid at time t
if an online method of verifying c’s status indicates that c was not revoked at time t′ and ti ≤ t ≤ t′.
Informally, if a credential is syntactically valid, it is well-formed. The semantic validity of a
credential at a given time implies that the credential has not been revoked by its issuer prior to that
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time; that is, the credential issuer asserts that the meaning of the credential is still valid. To ground
these definitions with a real-world example, in the case of credit card validation, verifying syntactic
validity involves checking that the signature on the back of the card matches the signature on the
charge slip, the card has an appropriate issuer logo on the front, and the expiration date has not
passed. Semantic validation occurs when the credit card clearinghouse authorizes a transaction.
Note that in the degenerate case that a credential is assumed to be a stable assertion, syntactic
validity implies semantic validity. We now define the more general concept of validity and derive
two propositions and a corollary that will be useful later in the paper.
Definition 3 (Validity). A credential c is valid at time t if it is syntactically and semantically
valid at time t.
Proposition 1. If a credential c is found to be syntactically valid at a time t′ such that α(c) ≤
t′ < ω(c), then c is syntactically valid at all times t where α(c) ≤ t < ω(c).
Proposition 2. If a credential c is semantically valid at a time t′ ≥ α(c), then c is semantically
valid at all times t where α(c) ≤ t ≤ t′.
Corollary 1. If a credential c is valid at a time t′ such that α(c) ≤ t′ < ω(c), then c is valid at all
times t where α(t) ≤ t ≤ t′.
As was observed earlier, each credential collected by an entity during a trust negotiation or
distributed proving protocol constitutes a piece of evidence attesting to a small portion of the global
state of the network. During a trust negotiation or the construction of a distributed proof, these
pieces of evidence are collected over time and used to incrementally satisfy a given authorization
policy. We now more precisely define one entity’s view of the system in terms of the credentials
acquired during a particular trust negotiation or distributed proving session.
Definition 4 (Credential State). Let the set T contain all possible timestamps and the null value
⊥. The state of a credential c as observed by an entity e is defined as sec = 〈c, r, syn, semv , semi〉 ∈
C × (T \ {⊥}) × B × T × T . The value r indicates the local time at which c was received by e.
The boolean value syn is true if c is syntactically valid, false otherwise. The values semv and semi
denote the most recent time that c was verified to be semantically valid and the first time that c was
found to be semantically invalid, respectively. If the semantic validity of c has not yet been checked,
both semv and semi will be set to ⊥, otherwise at least one of them will contain a valid timestamp
from the set T \ {⊥}. We use S to denote the set of all possible credential state tuples. Throughout
this paper, we will use dot notation to access fields of these state tuples (e.g., sec.r represents the
receipt time of the credential whose state is stored in sec).
Definition 5 (View). A set of credential states observed by an entity e is called one of e’s views
of the system. A view contains at most one credential state tuple for any particular credential c.
Given the above definitions, we now have a precise vocabulary for describing each entity’s
knowledge about the state of the system. Since this state information is gathered over time, it
cannot be considered to be a precise snapshot of the global state and thus the consistency of an
entity’s view of the system becomes important to consider.
Definition 6 (Relevance). A credential c is considered relevant to a policy P by entity e at time t
if e has received c and considers the satisfaction of P in some way dependent on c at time t. Given
a view Ve, V
P,t
e is the subset of Ve containing state information for credentials that e considers
relevant to P at time t.
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Definition 7 (View Consistency). A view V P,te is φ-consistent if V
P,t
e satisfies a predicate φ
that places temporal constraints on the times at which e observes the validity of each credential c
whose state information is stored in V P,te .
Definition 6 is very subtle, as it can vary from user to user. For instance, a naive user might
consider every credential that she has ever received to be relevant to a policy P , while another
user might only consider credentials explicitly mentioned in P to be relevant. Further, the set of
credentials considered relevant to a policy P by a single user might change over time. For example,
if Alice is evaluating the policy P = c1 ∧ (c2 ∨ c3), she may initially consider c1 and c2 relevant to
P and determine whether a consistent view can be constructed using these credentials. If this fails,
then she may decide that c1 and c3 are relevant to P and again attempt to construct a consistent
view. Consistency is fundamentally tied to the concept of relevance by Definition 7 and can thus
be undermined by a faulty interpretation of relevance (for instance, by assuming that nothing is
relevant to P ). At a minimum, entities should consider the set of credentials used to satisfy P to
be relevant to P and may also include other credentials in this set (for instance, credentials used
to satisfy the release policies protecting credentials disclosed during the authorization protocol
invoked to satisfy P ). Resource providers have the autonomy and local knowledge necessary to
decide which credentials are relevant at each moment and should thus be subjected to consistency
requirements.
2.3 Practical Considerations for Consistency Enforcement
In this paper, we focus on limiting the unexpected behaviors that trust negotiation and distributed
proving systems may manifest as a result of inconsistent views. To this end, we define several
enforceable notions of view consistency, discuss the guarantees provided by each, and provide
algorithms to attain these levels of view consistency in practice. In proposing practical mechanisms
for view consistency enforcement, we will keep several high-level requirements in mind.
Loose clock synchronization A minimal level of clock synchronization is necessary, as otherwise
the expiration times stored in credentials could not be reliably interpreted. However, we
cannot assume that clocks are closely synchronized (e.g., seconds).
Minimal cooperation View consistency is a concern only for the policy evaluator. We cannot
assume that groups of CAs, groups of CAs and users, or large groups of users will be willing
to cooperate, as there is no incentive for this.
Minimal impact to existing protocols Trust negotiation and distributed proving have been
active areas of research over the course of the last several years. To ensure that the work
done in these areas remains usable, view consistency enforcement should require minimal
changes to existing trust negotiation and distributed proving protocols.
In the remainder of this paper, our discussion proceeds bearing these requirements in mind. In
Section 5 we discuss how our solutions for enforcing view consistency satisfy these requirements.
3 Levels of Consistency
In this section, we present four increasingly-powerful levels of view consistency. We show that
the guarantees afforded by each of these consistency levels can be strengthened if assumptions can
(safely) be made about which of the above reasons for credential invalidation can be expected to
occur during the course of the authorization protocol. This indicates that like many other aspects of
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Figure 1: An incrementally consistent view.
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Figure 2: An internally consistent view.
trust negotiation and distributed proving, the choice of consistency level is likely to be a strategic
choice made independently by each protocol participant. We defer all discussion pertaining to
unstable environments until Section 5.
3.1 Incremental Consistency
To most people, the idea of satisfying a policy is straight forward. This usually entails presenting
the evidence required to justify each clause of the policy. For instance, if Alice wishes to cash a
check and is asked for two forms of ID, she could, for example, produce a driver’s license and a
passport during her transaction with the bank teller. The teller can verify that both IDs show
Alice’s picture and list the same home address and thus be reasonably satisfied that Alice is indeed
who she says that she is. The teller is convinced that her view of the “system” is consistent because
Alice could produce valid instances of the required documents during the course of their interaction.
We call this intuitive notion of consistency incremental consistency. To formally define incremental
consistency, we first define the predicates checked : S → B and φinc : 2S → B.
checked(s) ≡ (s.syn = true) ∧ (s.semv 6= ⊥) (1)
φinc(V ) ≡ ∀s ∈ V : checked(s) ∧ (α(s.c) ≤ s.r ≤ s.semv ) (2)
The predicate checked(s) is satisfied if and only if the syntactic validity of s.c has been verified
and s.c was ever observed to be semantically valid. The predicate φinc(Ve) is satisfied if and only
if each credential in the view Ve was valid at the point that it was received by e. Note that
Corollary 1 is used when computing the endpoints of each credential’s observed validity period.
Thus, the formal definition of incremental consistency is as follows.
Definition 8 (Incremental Consistency). A view V P,te is incrementally consistent iff φinc(V
P,t
e )
is true.
Incremental consistency works for Alice and the bank teller, as it is exceedingly unlikely that
Alice’s driver’s license or passport will be revoked or become invalid during their transaction. In
addition to being intuitively useful, incremental consistency is also widely used in practice. Current
trust negotiation prototypes (e.g., [4, 5, 12, 23]) implement incremental consistency by validating
credentials as they are received. This approach to credential validation is also discussed in many
papers that present protocols and strategies for trust negotiations and distributed proving that, to
the best of our knowledge, have not yet been implemented (e.g., [6, 14, 21, 24], to name a few).
Incremental consistency works especially well when authorization policies are stable predicates.
A stable predicate is a condition that remains true once it becomes true. Example stable predicates
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include “Alice has paid her 2005 income taxes” and “process X has terminated.” If all relevant
user attributes and environmental conditions are stable, then incremental consistency allows us to
conclude that all credentials used to satisfy a given policy were simultaneously valid at the time
of policy satisfaction. This, of course, assumes that we verify that no credential expired naturally
before the final decision was made.
If policy predicates are not stable, however, incremental consistency cannot guarantee that all
relevant credentials were ever valid simultaneously. For example, recall Example 1 presented in
Section 1. Figure 1 shows GeoTech’s view of Bob’s credentials in this system, where the valid-
ity periods of each credential are indicated with horizontal lines. GeoTech never observed Bob’s
PetrolOps and Purchase credentials to be valid simultaneously. With inter-credential dependencies,
such as that between Bob’s PetrolOps and Finance credentials, incremental consistency is not always
a good choice.
Although incremental consistency is the only form of view consistency supported by existing
trust negotiation prototypes, we believe that this is only because until now, the issue of view
consistency has not received any attention. The trust negotiation and distributed proving literature
is full of examples motivating the use of these systems in grid computing, dynamic coalitions, and
ubiquitous computing environments. These environments are all highly dynamic and, in some
cases, could involve the use of mutually-exclusive roles and access rights; under these conditions
incremental consistency is likely to be unsatisfactory. We now present three stronger notions of view
consistency that are easily enforceable in practice and discuss the guarantees that each provides.
3.2 Internal Consistency
In this section, we define and discuss a stronger notion of view consistency that we will call internal
consistency. Informally, if an authorization decision is made using an internally consistent view,
then all credentials relevant to the authorization decision were valid simultaneously at some point
in time during the authorization protocol. To formally define internal consistency, we first define
the functions start : 2S → T and end : 2S → T , and the predicate φint : 2S → B.
start(V ) = min({s.r | s ∈ V }) (3)
end(V ) = max ({s.r | s ∈ V }) (4)
φint(V ) ≡ (∀s ∈ V : checked(s))
∧(max ({α(s) | s ∈ V }) < min({s.semi | s ∈ V }))
∧(max ({α(s) | s ∈ V }) < end(V ))
∧(min({ω(s) | s ∈ V }) > start(V ))
(5)
The function start(V ) is the earliest local time at which a credential in V was received; similarly,
end(V ) is the latest local time at which a credential in V was received. For a given view, V , these
functions effectively bound the duration of the interactive portion of the associated authorization
protocol. The predicate φint holds true if and only if (i) each credential in the view was at one point
observed to be valid, (ii) the last credential to become valid does so before the minimum known
endpoint of any credential’s validity period, (iii) the last credential to become valid does so before
the end of the authorization protocol, and (iv) the minimum known endpoint of any credential’s
validity period occurs after the start of the authorization protocol.
Definition 9 (Internal Consistency). A view V P,te is internally consistent iff φint(V
P,t
e ) is true.
Internal consistency does not imply that all relevant credentials used to satisfy a policy are
valid simultaneously at the moment the policy is decided to be satisfied. Rather, it implies that
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Figure 4: An interval consistent view.
all relevant credentials are valid simultaneously at some point during the authorization protocol.
Given a graphic representation of an internally consistent view, one should be able to draw at least
one vertical line that intersects each credential’s validity interval (see Figure 2). If external events
cannot cause the revocation of a credential, then all credentials in an internally consistent view can
be shown to be valid at the time of policy satisfaction. However, should an external revocation
occur, this is not the case. Recall Example 2, in which all of Alice’s credentials were valid at the
start of the authorization protocol, but due to the NSF’s revocation of her ProjectSpread credential,
they were not all valid at the time that the decision was made.
3.3 Stronger Levels of Consistency
In some cases, it might be desirable not only to have the guarantee that each relevant credential in
a given view was valid simultaneously at some point during the authorization protocol, but rather
that they were all valid simultaneously at the endpoint of the authorization protocol. In others,
perhaps it is required that each relevant credential is valid from the time that it is received until
the decision point of the authorization protocol. We will call these levels of consistency endpoint
consistency and interval consistency, respectively (see Figures 3 and 4). These consistency levels
are defined in terms of the φend : 2S → B and φinterval : 2S → B predicates.
φend(V ) ≡ ∀s ∈ V : checked(s) ∧ (α(s.c) ≤ end(V ) ≤ s.semv ) (6)
φinterval(V ) ≡ ∀s ∈ V : checked(s) ∧ (α(s.c) ≤ s.r ≤ end(V ) ≤ s.semv ) (7)
Definition 10 (Endpoint Consistency). A view V P,te is endpoint consistent iff φend(V
P,t
e ) is
true at the decision point t.
Definition 11 (Interval Consistency). A view V P,te is interval consistent iff φinterval(V
P,t
e ) is
true at the decision point t.
Guaranteeing the interval consistency of the view used to evaluate an authorization policy
clearly affords the policy evaluator a high level of confidence in the outcome of the authorization
decision. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we showed that if certain assumptions could be made about the
likelihood of inter-credential dependencies and external causes of revocation, that incrementally
consistent and internally consistent views can actually be treated as endpoint consistent. Given
the above definitions, it should be clear that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 3. An interval consistent view is also endpoint and incrementally consistent, and an
endpoint consistent view is also internally consistent.
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One could imagine an extension of interval consistency requiring that all relevant credentials
remain valid from the time that they are received until the end of the interaction between the
two parties participating in the authorization protocol. That is, if Bob negotiates with GeoTech
to gain access to their database (as in Example 1), GeoTech might want to guarantee that it
could detect if any of Bob’s credentials were revoked after the end of the authorization protocol
and consequently prevent Bob from further accessing their database. In [18], the authors propose
an access control system for pervasive computing environments that accomplishes this under the
assumption that credential issuers will proactively push revocation information to endpoints in
the system. As discussed in Section 2.1, there is no incentive for CAs to maintain the local state
necessary to do this in a large open system. In fact, the soundness of algorithms requiring these
types of assumptions depends on the reliability with which revocation information is propagated.
Enforcement algorithms for the consistency levels discussed in this paper can be proven sound
without making such assumptions.
4 Algorithms for Consistency Enforcement
In this section, we discuss the enforcement of the view consistency levels previously presented.
We first enumerate the characteristics of an ideal algorithm for consistent view construction and
argue that such an algorithm is likely to be impossible to construct in practice. We then discuss
two practical algorithms for consistent view construction and use these algorithms to define two
extreme points on a multidimensional spectrum of trade-offs affecting view consistency algorithms.
We evaluate the costs associated with each of these algorithms and analyze the “distance” from
these practical algorithms from the idealized case.
4.1 Comments on the Ideal Case
Each algorithm that we present in this paper, and in fact the entire notion of view consistency, is
based on the conclusions that can be drawn from the observations of a single entity. As such, the
soundness of an algorithm designed to create φ-consistent views is only one concern of interest to
entities wishing to use that algorithm. Another important goal is quantifying the completeness of
this algorithm when compared to an algorithm run by an omniscient entity with complete knowledge
of the state of all credentials at all times; we will refer to this as ideal completeness. Since entities in
any realistic system cannot know the global state of the system at any given time, ideal completeness
provides an interesting best case to which the algorithms that we develop can be compared. As we
develop the algorithms in this section, we will quantify the shortcomings of these algorithms with
respect to ideal completeness. Since incremental consistency is easily implementable, we begin our
discussion with an algorithm for constructing internally consistent views.
4.2 Internal Consistency
Algorithm 1 ensures that the views used for authorization policy evaluation are internally consistent.
We make the following assumptions in Algorithm 1 (and later algorithms):
• The notation ←r denotes random assignment from a set. For example, s←r {0, 1}m assigns
to s a random salt value chosen from the set of all length-m binary strings.
• Each entity e ∈ E has a set of credentials Ce = {c1, . . . , cne}.
• There exists a globally agreed-upon cryptographic hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l where
l is the (fixed) output length of h(·).
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Algorithm 1: Internal Consistency
1: // Initialize a connection with entity e′
2: Function Init(e′ ∈ E) = Commit(e′)
3:
4: // Commit credentials to entity e′
5: Function Commit(e′ ∈ E) =
6: s←r {0, 1}m // create a salt
7: k ← ke − |Ce| // need k fake credentials
8: for i = 1 to k do
9: ri ←r {0, 1}m // generate fake credentials
10: CCe ← {h(s | c1), . . . , h(s | cn), h(r1), . . . , h(rk)}
11: Shuﬄe CCe randomly
12: Send 〈e, s, CCe〉 to e′
13:
14: // Receive committed credentials from entity e′
15: Function Rcv(e′ ∈ E, s′ ∈ {0, 1}m, CCe′ ∈ 2{0,1}
l
) =
16: if EntityInfo.lookup(e′) 6= ⊥ then
17: for all 〈c, r, syn, semv , semi 〉 ∈ View do
18: if c is semantically valid then
19: View .store(c, 〈c, r, true,NOW , semi 〉)
20: else
21: View .delete(c)
22: EntityInfo.store(e′, 〈NOW, s′, CCe′ 〉)
23:
24: // Receive a credential c from entity e′
25: Function Rcv(e′ ∈ E, c ∈ C) =
26: 〈rcv , s′, CCe′ 〉 = EntityInfo.lookup(e′)
27: if h(s′ | c) /∈ CCe′ then
28: Reject c
29: else if ((c is syntactically valid) and (α(c) ≤ rcv) and
(c is semantically valid)) then
30: View .store(c, 〈c,NOW , true,NOW ,⊥〉)
31: else
32: Reject c
Algorithm 2: Endpoint and Interval Consistency
1: // Receive a credential c from entity e′
2: Function Rcv(e′ ∈ E, c ∈ C) =
3: if c is syntactically valid then
4: View .store(c, 〈c,NOW , true,⊥,⊥〉)
5: else
6: Reject c
7:
8: // Invoked at the end of the access control protocol
9: Function ValidateAll(RelevantCreds ∈ 2C) =
10: for all 〈c, r, syn, semv , semi 〉 ∈ View do
11: if c ∈ RelevantCreds then
12: if (ω(c) > NOW ) and (c is semantically valid)
then
13: View .store(c, 〈c, r, true,NOW ,⊥〉)
14: else
15: Fail and report that c is invalid
Figure 5: Algorithms for view consistency enforcement.
• Each entity e chooses a parameter ke used to hide the number of credentials that she possesses.
• Each entity maintains a hash table, EntityInfo, mapping entity names to state information.
The function EntityInfo.store : E × (T \{⊥})×{0, 1}m×2{0,1}l → ⊥ stores state information.
The function EntityInfo.lookup : E → (T \{⊥})×{0, 1}m×2{0,1}l retrieves state information.
• Each entity maintains a hash table, View , mapping credential identifiers to credential state
information. The function View .store : C × S → ⊥ stores credential state information, while
View .delete : C → ⊥ deletes state information.
• The current time as observed by some entity e ∈ E is accessible via the local variable NOW .
Algorithm 1 works as follows. At the start of the authorization protocol, each entity calls the
Init method to commit her credentials and a strategically chosen amount of random noise to the
remote party. Each entity then stores her remote partner’s set of committed credentials in the
EntityInfo hash table. As credentials are received from the remote party during the authorization
protocol, the receiver checks to see if the credential was previously committed. If so, the credential
state information for this credential is created and stored; if not, the credential is removed from
View . Should one entity acquire new credentials at runtime, she can recommit her credential set
to the remote party by directly using the Commit method. If this occurs, the remote party must
immediately recheck the semantic validity of each credential stored in the current view and update
its associated credential state information (lines 17–22).
This credential recommit process involves fairly high communication overheads for the recipient,
as it must contact up to |View | servers to revalidate all potentially relevant credentials. To mitigate
denial of service attacks against implementations of this algorithm, entities should require that a
11
recommit message be accompanied by a credential that (i) is relevant at the moment it is received,
(ii) was not included in the previous credential set commitment, and (iii) was issued within some
fixed window of the time of the last negotiation round. This will ensure that unless parties receive
legitimate new credentials, they cannot force excess semantic validity checks. We now highlight
several interesting properties of Algorithm 1.
Proposition 4. Any view created using Algorithm 1 is incrementally consistent.
Proof. Lines 29–32 of Algorithm 1 ensure that each credential used during the execution of an
authorization protocol is valid when it is received. This satisfies Definition 8 and thus any view
created using Algorithm 1 is incrementally consistent.
Proposition 5. All credentials accepted by Algorithm 1 were held by their bearer at the time of the
most recent credential recommit.
Proof. For Algorithm 1 to accept some credential ci from entity e, it must be the case that e
committed ci at the last credential recommit (i.e., cci ∈ CCe). The preimage resistance property
of cryptographic hash functions implies that to generate some cci ∈ CCe , e is required to know
ci. This means that either (i) ci was issued to e prior to the last credential recommit or (ii) e
correctly guessed the contents of ci before it was issued. For case (i) then the proposition is true by
definition. For case (ii), e must have correctly guessed the signature value that would be placed on
ci by its issuer; this is generally thought to be impossible without knowledge of the issuer’s private
key. Thus, all credentials accepted by Algorithm 1 were held by their bearer at the time of the
most recent credential recommit.
Theorem 1. If e’s execution of a trust negotiation or distributed proving protocol for target policy
P succeeds at time t while using Algorithm 1 to enforce view consistency, then the view, V P,te is
internally consistent.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of times the Commit method is invoked by the
remote party. The base case involves one invocation of the Commit method; in this case, we will
show that all credentials received during the protocol were valid at the time that the credential
set was committed. Assume that some credential c such that 〈c, r, synv, syni, semv, semi〉 ∈ V P,te
is invalid at the start of the authorization protocol. By Proposition 4, c later becomes valid. This
contradicts our assumption that once a credential becomes invalid, it cannot again become valid
and thus c was valid at the time that the credential set was committed. This implies that all
credentials relevant to the satisfaction of P were valid at the time that the credential set was
committed. Assume the claim is true for trust negotiation or distributed proving sessions requiring
up to n − 1 invocations of the Commit method. If the trust negotiation or distributed proving
session requires n invocations of the Commit method, at the time of the nth recommit, lines 17–22
ensure that any previously valid credentials are still valid. By an argument similar to that used
in the base case, we know that any credentials accepted after the nth recommit were also valid at
the time of the nth recommit. Since all credentials were valid simultaneously at the time of the nth
recommit, Definition 9 is satisfied and V P,te is internally consistent.
Proposition 6. Algorithm 1 does not disclose credential contents (e.g., credential types or attribute
values) to the remote party. Further, if h(·) approximates a random oracle, then no entity can guess
the number of credentials held by their communication partner during a given run of the algorithm,
nor can they guess the number of new credentials committed during a recommit.
12
Proof. The first property follows from the preimage resistance property of cryptographic hash
functions. If h(·) approximates a random oracle, then its output distribution should appear the
same regardless of whether its input is a structured credential or a random value. This implies that
an adversary cannot determine how many of the committed values correspond to actual credentials
versus random noise and therefore the second property holds. To prove the third property, note that
because credentials are committed using a different salt for each recommit, unused credentials and
random commitments cannot be tracked from recommit to recommit. Note also that newly acquired
credentials replace either a previously unused credential or a random commitment. Clearly if a new
credential is used, the remote party can tell that it was in the new set of committed credentials, but
not the old set. However, by an argument similar to that used to prove the second property, the
adversary cannot tell how many newly acquired, but unused, credentials may be in a commitment
set, so the third property holds.
Although Theorem 1 asserts the soundness of Algorithm 1, this algorithm is not ideally complete
as discussed in Section 4.1. That is, it is possible for all credentials to be valid simultaneously at
the time of the last recommit even if Algorithm 1 fails. Consider the case that Bob commits several
credentials to Alice, all of which are valid at the moment the committed credential set is sent to
Alice. However, before Alice can verify some credential c that was committed by Bob, c’s issuing
CA revokes the credential. Alice thus cannot tell that c was valid at the time that the credential set
was committed, though an omniscient entity could. In Appendix A, we propose an online credential
status protocol that would allow Algorithm 1 to more closely approximate ideal completeness.
4.3 Endpoint and Interval Consistency
Algorithm 2 guarantees that all executions of an authorization protocol that succeed do so using
interval consistent views. In general, the strategy adopted by this algorithm is similar to that taken
in optimistic concurrency control algorithms for transaction management. That is, credentials are
syntactically validated as they arrive, as this can be done without external interaction, but are
assumed to be semantically valid. When a decision point is reached, the ValidateAll method is
invoked to check the semantic validity of each relevant credential in the view and terminates the
protocol if any credentials are found to be invalid. Because e has reached the decision point, it will
have the clearest idea yet as to which submitted credentials are actually relevant. If one of these
credentials is invalid, however, e can continue to search for another set that satisfies the policy; this
new set can then be checked for validity, and so on. If only endpoint consistent views are required,
then both the semantic and syntactic validity checks can be delayed until theValidateAllmethod.
Theorem 2. If an execution of a trust negotiation or distributed proving protocol for a target
policy P succeeds at time t while using Algorithm 2 to enforce view consistency, then the view V P,te
is interval, endpoint, internally and incrementally consistent.
Proof. Line 3 ensures that for each 〈c, r, synv , syni , semv , semi〉 ∈ V P,te , the credential c was syn-
tactically valid at time ti ≤ r. Line 12 ensures that each ci was semantically valid at some time
t′i ≥ end(V P,te ) and thus V P,te is interval consistent by Corollary 1. It is therefore endpoint, inter-
nally, and incrementally consistent by Proposition 3.
Although Algorithm 2 is sound (by Theorem 2) it is not ideally complete. Since the Vali-
dateAll method takes some finite, but non-instantaneous, amount of time to check the semantic
validity of each ci whose state is stored in V , it is entirely possible that each ci was valid at end(V ),
but one such credential was revoked before its semantic validity could be checked by the algorithm.
An omniscient entity could detect this event, even though it would go undetected by Algorithm 2.
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The well known limitations of causal orderings and virtual clocks [13, 9] lead us to conjecture that
any sound and complete algorithm for endpoint consistency will require synchronized clocks.
4.4 Trade-offs in Consistency Enforcement
In examining Algorithms 1 and 2, a clear trade-off emerges. By deferring semantic validation
checks until the end of the protocol, Algorithm 2 reduces the work for the verifier by allowing
her to semantically validate only the credentials that were ultimately determined to be relevant
to the satisfaction of the policy. This reduction in work comes at a price. In the case that the
policy being satisfied uses guard conditions to protect the disclosure of more sensitive portions
of the policy (e.g., as in [6, 14]), optimistically assuming that credentials are semantically valid
could leak sensitive policy information to unauthorized viewers. To correct this problem, each set
of guard conditions must be viewed as a sub-negotiation in its own right, so that the semantic
validity of the credentials satisfying the guard conditions is checked before access is granted to the
remaining policy. Alternatively, Algorithm 1 can be modified to call the ValidateAll method
at its conclusion. However, Algorithm 1 incurs much higher overheads for the verifier, as each
credential received must be validated throughout the protocol, as its relevance cannot be fully
determined until the end of the protocol.
These algorithms are two extreme points on the spectrum of possible consistency enforcement
algorithms. In some cases, an entity may prefer to aggressively monitor the validity of some
credentials received over the course of the authorization protocol, while deferring checks on other
credentials. For instance, for a policy P = c1 ∧ (c2 ∨ c3), it is clear that c1 is relevant to the
satisfaction of P . Thus c1 could be monitored more aggressively (using a scheme like that in
Algorithm 1), while checks on the validity of credentials c2 and c3 could be delayed until the end
of the protocol. Designing consistency enforcement algorithms that balance this trade-off between
relevance, work for the verifier, and information leakage will be an interesting challenge.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss several interesting facets of view consistency. In particular, we show that
the algorithms presented in this paper satisfy the requirements presented in Section 2.3, consider
the effects of an unstable environment on view consistency, and introduce the notion of strategic
algorithms for view consistency enforcement.
5.1 Requirements Revisited
In Section 2.3 we presented three requirements that view consistency algorithms should satisfy:
loose clock synchronization, minimal cooperation, and minimal impact on existing protocols. Each
algorithm presented in this paper relies only on its local perception of time and causal event
orderings; no synchronization with external sources is necessary. Further, only a small amount of
cooperation between entities is required for these algorithms to function correctly. Specifically, in
Algorithm 1, only the two parties engaged in the authorization protocol need to cooperate to form
a consistent view. The only way that the remote party can fail to cooperate in these algorithms is
to incorrectly commit her credential values; this failure can only deny her access to the requested
resource. Algorithm 2 requires no cooperation between entities in the system to succeed. Lastly,
the algorithms presented in this paper have virtually no impact on existing trust negotiation and
distributed proving protocols, as they were designed to wrap the functionality already provided by
existing protocols and systems. By disabling credential verification in existing systems and using
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wrapper code that implements the consistency checking algorithms presented in this paper, existing
systems can enforce stronger levels of view consistency.
5.2 Dynamic Environments
In context-rich environments like smart buildings and grid computing systems, it is entirely pos-
sible for authorization policies to be predicated on the state of the surrounding environment. For
instance, authorization policies may consider the time of day or the occupancy status of a room. A
malicious client can attempt to alter the state of their surrounding environment in unexpected ways
to twist the outcome of an authorization protocol. The environmental inputs to an authorization
protocol can consist of either certified environmental information collected by the client (or some
agent acting on his behalf) or observations made by the resource provider. In the event that only
certified environmental information is used, then the endpoint and interval consistency algorithms
presented in this paper can ensure that all environmental assertions remain true throughout the
duration of the authorization protocol. However, ensuring that observational data regarding system
context does not become invalidated is a more difficult task. The resource provider must either con-
tinuously monitor the pertinent state information or register to be alerted should its value change.
Periodically checking the state is insufficient, as the value could fluctuate between checks and not
be detected. If the resource provider has the capability to register such alerts, then this mechanism
combined with one of the algorithms presented in this paper can ensure that the consistency of
their view can be protected from the effects of unstable environmental conditions that are either
naturally occurring or maliciously induced.
5.3 Strategic Algorithm Design
Trust negotiation and distributed proving are dynamic processes, the properties of which depend
on the strategies or tactics adopted by their participants [3, 22, 25]. Similarly, the level of view
consistency required by a given entity is to some extent also a strategic decision (this is a further
extension of the trade-off noted in Section 4.4). The levels of view consistency presented in this
paper were designed to enforce various levels of safety, and thus the algorithms provided focused
on satisfying only this criteria. However, safety may not always be the only concern for some
resource providers. Rather, they may wish to enforce some level of safety but require algorithms
with stronger guarantees regarding the availability of their services or privacy preservation than
those provided by the algorithms in this paper.
For instance, recall that Algorithm 1 allows an entity Alice to hide her credentials in a set of
credentials and fake commitments of size ke. To do this, however, requires that she compute and
disclose the results of ke hashes; the overhead of this process quickly becomes burdensome as ke
increases. As a more efficient option, we can use Merkle trees [16] to allow Alice to hide her n
credentials in a set of ke = 2s fake credentials with minimal overheads. Specifically, Alice need
only compute and disclose a single commitment value to hide her n credentials and her negotiation
partner need only compute s hashes to determine whether a given credential is contained in a
particular commitment. We now briefly present this scheme, describe the upper bound on its
running time, and compare it to the commitment scheme presented as part of Algorithm 1.
If Alice wishes to create a commitment hiding her n credentials in a set of ke = 2s possible
credentials, she first assigns each of her credentials a random identifier from the set {0, 1}s and
then creates a binary tree with 2s leaves, where each leaf corresponds to exactly one identifier in
the set {0, 1}s. Alice then hashes each of her credentials and places each credential’s hash value at
the leaf of the tree corresponding to its identifier. Each unused subtree of the binary tree is then
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Figure 6: An example worst-case pruned binary tree for an instance of the Merkle commitment
scheme in which an entity is committing four real credentials. Fake subtrees are denoted with a ×
character.
removed and replaced with a random string from {0, 1}l henceforth referred to as a fake subtree;
recall from Section 4.2 that l is the output bit length of the agreed-upon hash function, h(·). At
this point, Alice computes the Merkle hash of this modified binary tree and discloses this single
l-bit value as her commitment.
Proposition 7. In the worst case, the Merkle tree commitment algorithm requires O(ns) hash com-
putations to produce a commitment value for n credentials in a set of ke = 2s possible credentials.
Proof. Note that the Merkle commitment algorithm achieves its worst running time when the
number of fake subtrees is maximized, as this maximizes the number of hash operations required to
combine all real credentials and fake subtrees; in practice, the number of fake subtrees is maximized
when the identifiers assigned to an entity’s actual credentials are uniformly distributed across the
identifier space {0, 1}s. For ease of exposition, assume that the number of credentials held by a given
entity is a power of 2. In this case, the resulting pruned binary tree constructed by the commitment
algorithm will consist of n “tendrils” of length log ke − log n = s − log n containing s − logn fake
subtrees and the hash of one real credential; these tendrils join the leaves of a complete binary
tree of depth logn (see Figure 6). Computing the Merkle hash of this pruned tree then requires
n(s+ 1)− n log n− 1 hash operations: s− log n hashes for each of the n tendrils and n− 1 hashes
to combine these n tendrils when hashing the complete binary tree of depth logn.
For Alice to enable her partner in the authorization protocol to verify that a particular credential
c is incorporated in her commitment value, she discloses the hash values of the s nodes along the
path from c to the root of the Merkle tree and the hash values representing the s subtrees connected
to this path. Her partner in the protocol can then recompute the value of the root of the Merkle
tree, thereby verifying that c is incorporated in this tree; this process requires s hash computations.
Proposition 8. The Merkle tree commitment algorithm does not disclose credential contents (e.g.,
credential types or attribute values) to the remote party. Further, if h(·) approximates a random
oracle, then no entity can guess the number of credentials held by their commitment partner during
a given run of the algorithm, nor can they guess the number of new credentials committed during a
recommit.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 6, the preimage resistance property of h(·) and the fact
that h(·) approximates a random oracle prevent the remote party from distinguishing between
real and fake leaves of the Merkle tree. By simple induction, this prevents the remote party from
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Number of actual credentials
ke 8 16 32 64 128 256
216 111 (0.3 ms) 207 (0.5 ms) 383 (0.6 ms) 703 (1.8 ms) 1279 (3.4 ms) 2303 (6.3 ms)
232 239 (0.7 ms) 463 (1.2 ms) 895 (2.8 ms) 1727 (4.7 ms) 3327 (8.9 ms) 6399 (16.8 ms)
264 495 (1.3 ms) 975 (2.8 ms) 1919 (5.2 ms) 3775 (10.3 ms) 7423 (19.8 ms) 14591 (38.9 ms)
2128 1007 (2.7 ms) 1999 (5.4 ms) 3967 (10.5 ms) 7871 (20.9 ms) 15615 (45.0 ms) 30975 (83.0 ms)
Table 1: Required numbers of hashes and corresponding hash computation times for various con-
figurations of the Merkle commitment algorithm.
distinguishing between real and fake subtrees of the Merkle tree. This implies that the remote
party cannot determine the number of real credentials committed in a particular value aside from
knowing that it is at least the number of credentials disclosed and verified during the execution of
the protocol and less than or equal to 2s. The third property follows directly from this fact.
Table 1 contains the number of hash operations required generate Merkle commitments for
between 8 and 128 actual credentials in sets containing between 216 and 2128 potential credentials,
along with the times required to compute these numbers of hashes.1 These running times indicate
that entities can easily commit their credentials into extremely large anonymity sets with only min-
imal computational and data transmission overheads when compared to those that would imposed
by the commitment scheme used in Algorithm 1. When combined with Propositions 7 and 8, this
shows that simply changing the commitment scheme used by Algorithm 1 allows us to tune both
the performance and privacy guarantees of Algorithm 1 without effecting the consistency property
that it enforces. This suggests that further analysis of these types of strategic trade-offs in view
consistency algorithms may be an interesting area of future research.
5.4 A Note of Caution Regarding CA Clock Skew
The algorithms in this paper assume that the times α(c) and ω(c) are interpreted relative to the
local clock, as is done in commodity software like web browsers. That is, if the local clock indicates
that ω(c) not yet passed, then c is accepted as syntactically valid. While in many cases this is a
safe assumption to make, especially if online semantic validity checks are made, it can in some cases
lead to troubles if CA clocks are poorly synchronized. For example, consider the case in which an
entity receives credentials c1 (issued by CA 1 and expiring at time t1) and c2 (pre-issued by CA
2 and becoming valid at time t2 ≤ t1) as part of an authorization protocol. Based on the local
interpretation of t1 and t2, the validity period of these credentials overlaps. However, if the clock
at CA 2 is slower than the clock at CA 1 by an amount of at least t1 − t2, then despite appearing
to overlap, the validity intervals of c1 and c2 never actually overlap.
Fortunately, the widespread use of time synchronization protocols such as NTP [17] by service
providers reduces the likelihood of this type of error randomly occurring between unrelated cre-
dentials. However, it is of the utmost importance that if two or more CAs issue mutually-exclusive
certificates, their clocks be closely synchronized to ensure that no misleading apparent overlaps
can occur. Such apparent overlaps are not introduced by the algorithms developed in this paper,
but rather by the widespread notion of using a local interpretation of certificate expiration times.
Fortunately, there is no way for an attacker to exploit this type of error without proactively altering
at least one CA’s clock prior to the issuance of some credential used in the negotiation that the
attacker wishes to alter.
1Timings were calculated using a Java implementation executed on a 2.5 GHz Pentium 4 with 512MB RAM
running Linux. All times reported are averages over 10 repeated trials.
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6 Related Work
Safety in trust negotiation has been discussed in several previous works, though the definitions
of safety used in these works differs from that considered in this paper. In [25] Yu and Winslett
describe the notion of “safe disclosure sequences.” Informally, they consider a trust negotiation safe
if each resource disclosed during the negotiation was “unlocked” (i.e., its authorization policy was
satisfied) at the time that it was disclosed. Winsborough and Li [22] note that under this notion
of safety, private information that is not explicitly revealed during a trust negotiation can still be
inferred based on the way that an entity carries out the negotiation. They propose several more
refined notions of safety for trust negotiation protocols based on the concept of indistinguishability,
each of which gives users stronger guarantees regarding the amount of private information leaked
during the negotiation. Irwin and Yu [11] propose another definition of safety based on the idea
of information gain. Our work is orthogonal to these previous works in that we are concerned
with safety problems that emerge as a result of the consistency of the underlying state information
used during policy evaluation rather than those that arise due to information leakage during a
negotiation. It would be prudent for system designers to consider both types of safety.
Another area of closely related work is that of concurrency control and consistency enforcement
in distributed systems, distributed databases, and distributed shared memory. Each of these areas
has a rich body of literature, surveys of which can be found in [20], [7], and [1], respectively. In
general, these problem domains assume that multiple entities will be updating values stored at
multiple locations within the system and as such, maintaining data consistency is of concern to
everyone. Therefore, solutions to transaction management in these domains typically involve the
cooperation of multiple entities, as every entity has incentive to cooperate. However, as was men-
tioned in Sections 1 and 2.1, groups of entities have no incentive to cooperate in solving the view
consistency problem for trust negotiation and distributed proving since this problem is of concern
only to a particular resource provider evaluating a particular policy. Therefore, the solutions devel-
oped in the distributed systems, distributed databases, and distributed shared memory literature
are unsuitable for our problem domain; the solutions that we develop in this paper require only the
cooperation of, at most, the two parties participating in the authorization protocol.
A final area of related work is the collection of system state snapshots in distributed systems.
Collecting consistent snapshots that can be used to evaluate stable predicates over the system state
is a well-known problem, to which an elegant solution is presented in [8]. This algorithm is not
directly applicable to the problem addressed in this paper, however, due to the unstable nature of
credential statuses. There exist algorithms for collecting distributed state snapshots that can be
used to evaluate unstable predicates (for a survey, see [2]), though these algorithms have very high
overheads and make unreasonable assumptions about process cooperation for our problem domain.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented the notion of view consistency in trust negotiation and distributed
proving authorization systems. We showed that failing to consider the consistency of the system
views used during executions of these protocols can cause a marked decrease in the safety of the
decisions made by the underlying authorization system. We then defined the incremental, internal,
endpoint, and interval consistency levels and demonstrated algorithms to attain these consistency
levels in practice. We proved the soundness of each of these algorithms and commented on their
completeness when compared to an ideal algorithm run by an omniscient entity. These algorithms
require at most the cooperation of the two parties involved in the authorization process; should any
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entity not cooperate, the algorithms will fail rather than violate the consistency conditions that
they were designed to enforce.
There are several areas of interesting future work relating to view consistency. As alluded to
in Section 5.3, the design of consistency enforcement algorithms that make a variety of trade-offs
regarding safety, availability, and privacy-preservation properties could prove to be a fruitful area
of investigation. Given the autonomous nature of the entities participating in trust negotiation
and distributed proving authorization protocols, it would be beneficial to explore the notion of
interoperable families of algorithms for consistency enforcement (as was done in [25] for trust
negotiation strategies). This would allow each entity to acquire the consistency level she requires
without placing unnecessary constraints on her communication partners. Another area of future
work involves the development of consistent views shared by several entities in the system. Given
the falling costs associated with fine-grained clock synchronization via technologies such as GPS
and an increased interest in distributed authorization, interesting notions of view consistency are
likely to emerge from a study of this topic.
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A Towards Completeness for Internal Consistency Algorithms
In this section, we propose an online credential status verification protocol that, when used in
conjunction with Algorithm 1, would allow the modified Algorithm 1 to more closely approach ideal
completeness. Figure 7 illustrates this two message protocol. In this protocol, a client provides
the verification service with a credential whose status she wishes to verify and a nonce value whose
length is chosen by the client. The service then determines the current validity status of the
provided credential and returns the credential, the nonce, and the current status of the credential
signed with its private key, K−1S , whose public counterpart, KS , is assumed to be well-known.
Recall that Algorithm 1’s shortcomings with respect to ideal completeness arise when all of
Bob’s credentials are valid when they are committed to Alice, but some credential is revoked before
Alice validates it. Now, assume that each CA runs the online credential status verification service
implementing the protocol presented in Figure 7. If Alice chooses a random nonce and sends it to
Bob prior to Bob committing his credential set to Alice, Bob can obtain certified validity statements
for each of his credentials from their respective issuing CAs, each of which includes Alice’s nonce.
Bob can then commit these validity statements along with each of his credentials to Alice. As Bob
discloses a credential to Alice during the authorization protocol, he must also disclose its associated
certified validity statement to Alice. Alice can now verify that the credential was valid at the time
that it was committed by Bob.
Proposition 9. If a credential c and its associated certified validity statement
cvs = 〈c,nonce, true〉 are contained in the commitment set received by Alice, then c was valid
at the time that Alice disclosed her b-bit nonce to Bob with probability 1− 2−b, provided that Alice
chose her nonce value at random.
Proof. Assume that Bob obtained cvs prior to the time that Alice disclosed nonce. This implies
that Bob correctly guessed nonce, which he can do only with probability 2−b if Alice chose nonce
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at random. Thus, with probability 1− 2−b, Bob obtained cvs after Alice disclosed nonce. As long
as Alice ensures that α(c) is less than or equal to the time that she sent Bob nonce, then she can
conclude that c was valid at the time that she disclosed nonce to Bob.
The above proposition allows Alice to conclude that all credentials used during the authorization
protocol were valid at the time of the most recent recommit, provided that she chooses a new nonce
for each recommit. This credential status protocol allows a modified version of Algorithm 1 to more
closely approximate ideal completeness. This also allows Alice to shift the responsibility of verifying
the semantic validity of Bob’s credentials to Bob; if Alice is a very busy resource provider, this
could allow her to increase the number of trust negotiation sessions that she can complete per unit
time. However, this modified Algorithm 1 is still incomplete, as each of Bob’s credentials may be
valid when he receives Alice’s nonce, but one of them might be revoked prior to his obtaining a
certified credential validity statement from its issuing CA. This is similar to the problem discussed
in Section 4.3 in which Algorithm 2 could fail because validating all relevant credentials takes a
non-zero amount of time. As in that case, it is unlikely that ideal completeness could be reached
without the assumption of synchronized clocks.
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